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Abstract
Group-structured and neighbor-structured populations are
compared, especially in relation to multilevel selection the-
ory and evolutionary transitions. I argue that purely neighbor-
structured populations, which can feature the evolution of al-
truism, are not properly described in multilevel terms. The
abilityto“gestaltswitch”betweenindividualistandmultilevel
frameworks is then linked to the investigation of “major tran-
sitions” in evolution. Some explanatory concepts are naturally
linked to one framework or the other, but a full understanding
is best achieved via the use of both.
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The starting point of this article is a distinction between
two kinds of population structure that can make a difference
to evolutionary processes. The distinction is between popula-
tions divided into discrete groups and populations in which
individuals interact locally with their immediate neighbors,
but where there are no group boundaries. In the ﬁrst section,
the distinction is described more precisely. In that section my
goals are largely critical; I argue that the role of this distinc-
tion has not been recognized in some previous discussions.
Neighbor-structured populations are sometimes described us-
ingamultileveltheoreticalframeworkborrowedfromworkon
group-structuredpopulations.Iarguethatthisisamistake,and
that this point also has consequences for our understanding of
the evolution of altruistic behavior.
Thesecondpartofthearticlelinksthedistinctionsmadein
the ﬁrst part to earlier discussions of “pluralist” treatments of
levels-of-selection questions and to theorizing about the “ma-
jor transitions” in evolution. Pluralists have argued that group
structure can be seen both as a special kind of environmental
context confronted by individual organisms, and in terms of
the presence of a population of higher level collectives. This
duality of perspective has a special role when thinking about
evolutionary transitions that involve the binding together of
lower level units into a higher level evolutionary individual.
In this section I make connections to recent work by Carl
Schlichting, Dan McShea, and Brett Calcott, as well as to less
recent work by a long-dead Victorian.
1. Multilevel Selection and Two Kinds of Population
Structure
The simplest models of evolution treat populations as unstruc-
tured; the evolving population is imagined as comprising a
large, well-mixed soup. If interaction between individuals is
important (in the treatment of mating, contests, and so on),
then it takes place at random.
Real populations are structured in space, of course, and
interactionbetweenindividualsisgenerallynotrandom.There
is a long tradition of modeling the consequences of such struc-
ture for evolutionary processes (Wright 1932; Levene 1953;
Hamilton 1975; Wilson 1980; Wade 1985). In evolutionary
biology, the main approach taken by theorists has been to look
at consequences of the division of a population into discrete
groups. These might be persisting “demes,” or shorter-lived
aggregations. An alternative approach, often treated as sec-
ondary in the evolutionary literature, supposes that individuals
are located on a spatial array, interacting locally with their
neighbors but without group boundaries.
The relation between these two kinds of population struc-
turehasoftenbeendiscussedfairlyinformally.MaynardSmith
(1976) used the distinction to insist that kin selection is not
always a form of group selection, because kin selection can
be important in neighbor-structured populations where group
boundaries are not present. Hamilton (1964, 1975) coined the
term “viscous population” for, roughly speaking, cases of the
neighbor-structured kind where dispersal after reproduction is
local. Wilson (1975, 1980) noted the distinction between the
two kinds of population structure when he ﬁrst developed his
“trait-group” model of group selection. Wilson used the term
“group” very broadly, however, distinguishing “discrete” as
opposed to “continuous” trait-groups. The case he described
in terms of “continuous trait-groups” corresponds to what I
call a neighbor-structured population.
In theoretical discussion, neighbor-structured models
wereforsometimeoftentreatedassecondary.(Nunney[1985]
is an exception.) More theoretical effort has been devoted
to the consequences of the partitioning of populations into
groups (Wade 1985). But recent years have seen a surge of
interest in models of behavioral evolution that employ spa-
tial lattices and game-theoretic interactions between neigh-
bors. This includes some striking work on cooperation and
altruism (Nowak and May 1992; Wilson et al. 1992; Alexan-
der and Skyrms 1999; Mitteldorf and Wilson 2000; Skyrms
2004; Werfel and Bar-Yam 2004). This new work has con-
siderable importance for foundational questions, but it has
sometimes been misdescribed. Theoretical principles devel-
oped for the group-structured cases are borrowed and applied
to the neighbor-structured cases, even when their application
to these cases is questionable. In a sense, the tools of theoret-
ical description have not kept pace with the development of
new models.
The reasons for this phenomenon are interesting from
a methodological point of view. Evolutionary change in a
neighbor-structured population on a spatial lattice tends to
be difﬁcult to describe mathematically in analytic terms over
many generations. This is because if reproduction is treated
as a spatially local matter, then the “viscosity” of the popula-
tion tends to affect everything in the model. It affects not just
the ﬁtness of individuals at one time-step, but also the future
distribution of distribution of individuals on the lattice, and
hence the future distribution of neighborhoods experienced by
individuals. So work on these models is often done with sim-
ulations, and research of this kind has advanced rapidly as the
technology of computer simulation has improved.
Thefeaturesofneighbor-structuredpopulationsthatIwill
focus on here, however, can be discussed using a simpliﬁed
case that can be compared very directly to the familiar group-
structured cases. We achieve the simpliﬁcation by making the
spatial distribution of individuals ephemeral rather than per-
sisting. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
In the case depicted in Figure 1(A), any individual has
ﬁtness-affecting interactions with four other group members.
In the case depicted in Figure 1(B), any individual has ﬁtness-
affectinginteractionswithitsfouredge-neighbors(alsoknown
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Figure 1.
A, A discrete trait-group model and, B, an “ephemeral” neighbor-structured
model.
as its “Von Neumann neighbors”). In both cases, the life cycle
includes the regular formation and dissolution of population
structure. In each case, population structure is generated (in
the form of either groups or a lattice), selection then occurs,
and asexual reproduction dissolves the population structure
and creates a “pool” from which a new generation is formed.
In some ways, these two models are very similar. For ex-
ample,variouskindsof“altruism”canevolveineach.Roughly
speaking, an altruist is an individual who donates beneﬁts to
other individuals around it, at some cost to the donor. Stan-
dard deﬁnitions of altruism for group-structured populations
must be modiﬁed to be applicable to the neighbor-structured
situation, but the core principles are the same in each case.1
In particular, a positive association or “clumping” of types in
the population helps the altruistic type in both kinds of popu-
lation. Via this association, the beneﬁts of altruistic behavior
fall preferentially on other altruists.
There has been extensive discussion of how we should
describe the process in Figure 1(A), where the population is
divided into discrete groups. In particular, should we apply a
“multilevel” approach that distinguishes processes of within-
group and between-group selection? Provisionally, let us say
“yes” to that question.
How should we then describe the neighbor-structured
case? It is common to treat the neighbor-structured case as
a messier, but fundamentally similar, version of the familiar
group-structured case. As noted above, theoretical principles
developedforthegroup-structuredcaseareoftenborrowedfor
theneighbor-structuredcase.Forexample,thesuccessofanal-
truisttypeisoftenexplainedintermsofabetween-groupforce
favoringaltruismprevailingoverwithin-groupselectionfavor-
ing the selﬁsh type. This is seen, in slightly different forms,
in Wilson (1980), Nunney (1985), Sober and Wilson (1998),
and Okasha (2007).2 I hold, however, that the multilevel des-
cription often borrowed for the neighbor-structured case
relies on features that are only present in the group-structured
case.3
I will go through this argument in detail. The core of the
multilevel framework, as noted above, is the distinction be-
tween selection within and between groups. Some groups do
better than others, and some individuals do better than oth-
ers within their groups. To apply this multilevel description,
we need a partition of the total population into groups. These
groupsarecollectiveorhigherlevelentities,eachmadeupofa
number of lower level individuals. At least some of the groups
shouldhavemorethanonemember,andeachindividualshould
be a member of only one group. (I will later discuss the pos-
sibility of a partial relaxing of this requirement.) Further, for
there to be competition or selection between these groups, we
need the population to contain more than one group. Lastly,
if the groups recognized are nonarbitrary, there must be some
real biological relation between individuals that determines
who is in a group with who.
I will introduce a more formal framework for describ-
ing some of these requirements. Groups in the sense sketched
above are equivalence classes of individuals.4 If groups are
described by means of a relation x is in the same group as y,
deﬁnedonthelowerlevelindividuals,weﬁndthatthisrelation
is reﬂexive, symmetrical, and transitive.5 This is an “equiva-
lence relation” and it collects entities into equivalence classes.
We then face a key question: which facts about the biologi-
cal interactions between individuals determine who is in the
same group? What is the biological basis for the equivalence
relation x is in the same group as y? If some single relation
is supposed to determine the grouping, then it must also be
an equivalence relation, given the nature of the structure it is
supposed to generate.
It is easy to see how this works in the group-structured
model in Figure 1(A). In models of this kind, the population is
divided into collections or subsets, such that everyone inside a
subset affects the absolute ﬁtness of everyone else inside that
subset, and no one outside a given subset (directly) affects the
absolute ﬁtness of anyone inside that subset.6 In models of
altruism, for example, there might be a rule applying to the
population such that each individual receives a ﬁxed ﬁtness
beneﬁt r from every altruist in its group, and from no one
outside its group. (In these models, altruists usually are said to
payaﬁxedcostc regardlessofthecompositionoftheirgroup.)
In cases of this kind, the relation x has its ﬁtness affected by
the character of y is an equivalence relation. This relation
is reﬂexive, symmetrical, and transitive.7 So in this case we
can look at the pattern of relations by which one individual’s
character affects the ﬁtness of another, and use these facts
to partition the population into a set of nonarbitrary groups,
around which lines can be drawn as in Figure 1(A).
Things are different in the case in Figure 1(B). In some
ways, the problem is obvious from inspection—there is no
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nonarbitrarypartitionofthepopulation.Butitisworthworking
through the formal treatment to see how the problem arises.
As in the group-structured case, each individual has
ﬁtness-affecting interactions with a limited number of other
individuals, its neighbors. But in the case where neighbor in-
teractions affect ﬁtness, the relationx has itsﬁtness affected by
the character of y is not an equivalence relation. The relation
is reﬂexive and symmetrical, but not transitive.8 So the rela-
tion x has its ﬁtness affected by the character of y cannot be
used directly to partition the population into subsets, where all
members of a subset have the relevant relation to all the others
inside the subset and not to anyone outside.
Might there be a way to use the relations between individ-
uals in Figure 1(B) in a more indirect way to do the required
job? Suppose individuals might be placed in the same group in
virtue of a chain of ﬁtness-affecting interactions, as well as a
directinteraction.Thuswemaketherelationthatcollectsindi-
vidualsintogroupsintoatransitiverelation.Buttheneveryone
in the population will be collected together into one big group,
as everyone can be linked in such a chain to everyone else.
There is then no possibility of competition between distinct
groups in the population.
Another response might be to say that each individual is
at the center of its own cross-shaped group; there are as many
groups as individuals.9 Let us think through the details of this
idea. We now say that every individual is both the “focal”
member or center of one group, and also a nonfocal member
of four other groups. We could deﬁne a collective output, or
group-level ﬁtness, for objects of this kind. Here, just as in
the more familiar models of the Figure 1(A) type, we treat the
collective output of a group as the combined or mean output
of all individuals within it. A cross-shaped group is still a
group, in this sense. Some crosses will be more productive
than others, and some individuals within any cross-shaped
group will do better than others. But each individual’s output
now counts toward ﬁve different groups; everyone’s ﬁtness is
beingquintuple-counted.Andas each individual has itsoutput
affected by its own neighbors, nonfocal group members are
mostly being affected by the character of individuals who are
not in their group.
An example can be used to make this more concrete. Sup-
posethetwotypesinthepopulation,AandB,aredescribedby
the following ﬁtness relationships (formally given in note 1).
First,theB-typedoesbetterthantheA-typeinanygivenneigh-
borhood. Second, it is true of both types that they have higher
ﬁtness in direct proportion to the number of A-types among
their neighbors. The A-type is then an altruist, and the B-type
is selﬁsh.
Now consider a particular group, G, containing a focal
individual of the selﬁsh type surrounded by four altruist in-
dividuals. What contribution will these altruists make to the
group ﬁtness? We do not yet know. The nonfocal altruists will
make a big contribution to G’s ﬁtness if they are surrounded
by altruist types on their other three sides, and a small contri-
bution if surrounded by selﬁsh types. So three out of four of
the neighbors whose character affects a nonfocal individual’s
contributiontoagroupwillnotthemselvesbemembersofthat
group.Puttingitdifferently,forfouroftheﬁvegroupsthatany
individual is counted in, three quarters of its ﬁtness-affecting
interactions are with individuals outside that group.
Byallowingforthequintuple-countingofeachindividual,
and by looking constantly outside a group when determining
anindividual’scontributiontothatgroup,itmaybepossibleto
recoveraformaldescriptionofevolutioninthesecasesthatos-
tensiblyusesthelanguageofwithin-groupandbetween-group
processes.Butthefactthatthenumberofgroupsisthesameas
thenumberofindividualsshowsthat,evenasidefromthegreat
artiﬁciality of this description, we have abandoned a core idea
ofmultilevelselectiontheory,theideaofpartitioningthelower
levelpopulationintoarangeofcompetinghigherlevelentities.
Idonotknowofanyattempttoactuallypresentamathematical
analysis of selection in a purely neighbor-structured popula-
tion by calculating between-group and within-group ﬁtness
differences. It is quite common to give informal summary de-
scriptions of change in neighbor-structured populations using
the language of multilevel selection theory, but the underlying
calculations are done in individualist terms, and the viability
of the informal descriptions is exactly what I am challenging
here. In cases of the Figure 1(B) kind, population structure
instead operates as an aspect of the environment, or context,
confronted by individuals.
So this ﬁrst stage of my argument can be expressed in the
form of a necessary (not sufﬁcient) condition on the presence
of multilevel selection in a structured population.10 Multilevel
selection requires the presence of nonarbitrary equivalence
classes of lowerlevel entities, or at least an approximation to
this situation.
I emphasize the qualiﬁcation “or at least an approxima-
tion.”Supposeapopulationconsistsofgroupswithreasonably
clear boundaries, within which all individuals strongly affect
each other’s ﬁtness, but with some degree of overlap between
the groups. Such a case would clearly approximate the sim-
pler case where there are genuine equivalence classes, and
that should be sufﬁcient. But there are also cases of structured
populations that do not approximate the required condition at
all, and the purely neighbor-structured case in Figure 1(B) is
a clear example.
These facts about the special role of neighbor-structured
populations have been neglected, I suggest, because people
tend to derive theoretical principles from analytically sim-
pler group-structured models where there are equivalence
classes.11 The resulting theoretical principles are then applied
generally. But there have always been clues around, pointing
to the phenomena that I focus on here. The most important of
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these clues is the fact that the Price equation, the most popu-
lar tool for the formal representation of multilevel selection,
requires a partition of the population into equivalence classes
when it is used for this purpose. So if, in some real-life case,
there is partial overlap between groups, and hence only an ap-
proximation to the requirement of equivalence classes, using
the Price equation requires that we “clean up” the partition,
and suppose there is no overlap.
Peoplemayalsosometimesresistthemessageofthesear-
gumentsbecausetheyseemtoshowthatinneighbor-structured
populationsonly“individualselection”canexist.Altruismcan
evolve in neighbor-structured populations, and it may seem
that pure “individual selection” is incapable of explaining how
altruism could survive.12 So it might then appear that drop-
ping the language of multilevel selection in these cases in-
volves dropping the key to the explanation of how altruism
is possible. But to say this is to mistake the resources of a
sophisticated individualist or contextualist treatment of how
these cases work. The key to the evolution of strong forms of
altruismispositivelycorrelatedinteractionbetweenindividual
types (Hamilton 1975; Michod and Sanderson 1985; Skyrms
1996; Frank 1998).13 The idea that correlation is essential to
the evolution of strong forms of altruism is sometimes pre-
sented as a crucial principle within multilevel selection theory
(e.g., Wilson 1977). I think that some people regard an em-
phasis on multilevel selection and an emphasis on correlated
interaction as amounting almost to the same thing. But they do
not amount to the same thing. Correlated interaction can ex-
ist in purely neighbor-structured populations that do not have
group boundaries and cannot be partitioned nonarbitrarily into
a set of higher level collective entities. So one key message
that can be drawn from models of neighbor-structured popula-
tions is that correlation, which is in many ways the key to the
evolution of altruism, does not require group structure.
More generally, my aim in this section is to urge the
recognition of the different kinds of relational structures that
populations can be embedded in. Some of these networks of
relationslinkingindividualsgenerateequivalenceclasses,mo-
tivating the recognition of a higher level population of groups,
and some do not. When the relations between individuals do
not generate (at least an approximation of) a partition into
equivalence classes, it is a mistake to look for a multilevel
description. Instead, we have a different kind of structure, mo-
tivating a different theoretical treatment.
2. Gestalt Switching and the Evolutionary Transi-
tions
In the previous section I contrasted two cases:
(i) Populations divided into discrete groups, where there is no
overlap between and no structure within the groups
versus
(ii) Neighbor-structured populations, with no divisions into
groups or distinct regions.
The discussion so far has been idealized in two respects.
First,ithasonlyconsideredextremes.Eithermodel,whenused
to describe a real empirical situation, will usually be a simpli-
ﬁcation. Generally, we will ﬁnd a mixture or combination of
both kinds of structure.
Secondly, so far we have imagined the population struc-
ture as imposed on the organisms by their circumstances. But
in most cases, the pattern of interactions between organisms
that affects ﬁtness will be a product, in part, of the organisms’
own behavior and other phenotypic characteristics. Popula-
tion structure and the evolutionary response to it will often
coevolve. An important case of this is seen in the creation and
maintenance of boundaries by collections of living things, the
creation of a division between a richly connected ingroup and
the rest of the world.
Cells within a complex multicellular organism provide a
useful illustration of the role of both idealizations here. For
some purposes, an organism is a collection of cells that can
be seen as forming an equivalence class. That is, in some
contexts all that matters is whether or not a cell is part of the
same organism as certain other cells. The total population of
human cells can be partitioned (approximately) into those that
are my cells, those that are your cells, and so on. Here, cell x is
part of the same organism as cell y is an equivalence relation.
But when we are thinking about these cells for other pur-
poses, we will recognize, of course, that an organism is inter-
nally organized, and many important relations between cells
are intransitive and asymmetric. One cell is next to another,
which is next to others again. One cell is nearer to the periph-
ery of the system than another. The same will apply in many
other cases of important collective entities—genes on a chro-
mosome, or individuals within a social group, for example.
A connection can be made here to the “gestalt-switching
pluralism” about some levels of selection debates defended
in Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002). There we argued, for the
simple case of discrete groups, that it is often good to switch
between two ways of thinking about the higher level structure
in a population. We can think of groups both as collectives, as
the bearers of group-level ﬁtness values, and also as aspects
of the context or environment experienced by lower level in-
dividuals. Each of these ways of describing group structure,
collectively versus contextually, tends to highlight some facts
at the expense of others.14 Consequently, it is useful to be
able to freely switch between these two ways of looking at
a single system. This position is a relative of earlier “plu-
ralist” views developed for trait-group models by Dugatkin
and Reeve (1994) and Sterelny (1996). In the previous section
of this paper I conceded the value of a multilevel descrip-
tion of the group-structured cases, but that concession should
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be understood within the larger framework of gestalt-shifting
pluralism. So the overall argument of the previous section can
be summarized in this terminology by saying that trait-group
structure can be thought of in both collective and contextual
terms, but the neighbor-structured case can only be treated
contextually.
In the rest of this section I will argue that this gestalt shift-
ing between different ways of looking at population structure
will be especially important when thinking about the “major
transitions”inevolution(MaynardSmithandSzathm´ ary1995;
Michod 1999).15
The distinction discussed earlier has two kinds of rele-
vance to the transitions. First, understanding the major transi-
tions is, in many cases, understanding the evolution of higher
level collectives from a state in which the relational struc-
ture was different. This is clearest in cases where transitions
include appearance of new boundaries, creating a divide be-
tween members of a collective and the environment.
But second, during the process of transition itself, both
ways of thinking about population structure may be impor-
tant, each giving us conceptual purchase on distinct aspects of
the situation. One reason for this is the fact that some theoret-
ical concepts that are relevant here bring with them a “logic”
that goes with one viewpoint or the other, contextual or col-
lective.
I will discuss this by means of a particular example, Carl
Schlichting’s recent work on “developmental reaction norms”
(Schlichting 2003). Consider an idealized situation where we
have a collection of cells, or other lower level units, coming
together to form a coordinated higher level entity.16 As Buss
(1987), Calcott (unpublished), and others have emphasized,
such an evolutionary process is affected by two factors that
pull in different directions. Using a terminology employed by
Calcott, the evolution of a higher level collective must simul-
taneously achieve both the alignment of reproductive interest
and the generation of beneﬁt.
The problem of the alignment of reproductive interest is
the evolutionary reﬂection of the more general problem of
conﬂict, free riding, and subversion in collective enterprises.
In the evolutionary case, the relevant forms of subversion tend
to involve unconstrained reproduction by lower level entities,
attheexpenseofthecollective.Homogeneityinthecollective,
of some relevant kind, helps avoid this problem. Close genetic
relatedness between the potentially reproducing components,
for example, can bring about an alignment of reproductive
interests.
However,thishomogeneityoftenreducesthebeneﬁtsthat
make the collective worth entering into. That is why the align-
ment of reproductive interest can pull against the generation
of beneﬁt. Although size per se can be a useful feature of a
collective (Bonner 1988), often the beneﬁts of membership in
a collective derive from the division of labor, and the coor-
dination of disparate activities. These require some relevant
heterogeneity of parts. So one aspect of the overall problem
pulls in the direction of homogeneity and the other pulls to-
ward heterogeneity. In the case of multicellular organisms, as
Buss and Schlichting emphasize, this is a key theme in the
evolution of development and cellular differentiation.
Schlichting suggests that we can make conceptual
progress on this problem by using the reaction norm concept
(SchlichtingandPigliucci1998).Thereactionnormconceptis
usually applied at the level of whole organisms; here we apply
it at the suborganismal level. Suppose we are thinking about
a collection of genetically identical or very similar cells. It is
easy to fall into the habit of thinking that this genetic similar-
ity implies phenotypic similarity. But strictly, what these cells
have in virtue of their genetics is a common reaction norm.
The cells will have the potential to produce various different
statesandactivities,givendifferentenvironmentalstimuli.The
absenceofthissensitivity—a“canalized”phenotypethatisnot
conditional on environmental stimuli—issomething that takes
evolutionary “work” to evolve. It is not the natural, prior, or
default state.
So a collection of genetically identical cells will usually
have some capacity to differentiate, via the role of different
stimuliinteractingwiththeircommonreactionnorm.Butwhat
is the source of the different stimuli that generate these differ-
ent “realized” phenotypes in the lower level entities?
Here we need to think in terms of a particular set of rela-
tions linking the lower level entities. Think of the cells arrayed
as a group in space. Some cells will be near the periphery,
some near the center. This fact alone will imply that they ex-
perience somewhat different microenvironmental conditions.
Peripheral cells will be more directly affected by external con-
ditions; cells in the center will be affected more by products
of other cells in the group. Those different conditions will
interact with the common reaction norm to produce different
realized phenotypes. So differentiation per se is not something
that needs explanation, once we remember to think in terms
of reaction norms, and once we note the ubiquitous nature
of microenvironmental differences for collections existing in
space.
In some ways this argument is very old. Reasoning of this
kind was central to the elaborate evolutionary speculations of
HerbertSpencer(1866,1872).Spencerheldthathomogeneity,
an undifferentiated condition in a system, is inherently unsta-
ble. Natural tendencies will produce differentiation, and this
will be seen in all systems. One of Spencer’s examples was
exactlythecaseofaninitiallyhomogeneouscollectionlocated
in space, with some elements subject more to inﬂuences from
the external environment than others. The result, for Spencer,
will be the inevitable differentiation of parts.17
Here as elsewhere, Spencer greatly over-played this ar-
gument. He saw the phenomenon as applicable on too many
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scales and with too much reliability. But such reasoning may
be quite useful in some cases. In recent work, McShea (2005)
has sought to extract a useful core from Spencer’s reasoning,
and has applied a moderate “instability of homogeneity” prin-
ciple to problems involving macroevolutionary trends toward
greater complexity. For McShea, the indeﬁnite retention of a
simple, homogeneous condition is not a default state, which
evolutionary forces must work against. The opposite is true.
Natural tendencies will tend to produce increases in a basic
kind of structural complexity, for general reasons of the kind
sketched above. Most of this complexity will be maladaptive,
mere noise or worse. Selection may be pushing against com-
plexity most of the time. But of course, some rare increases in
complexity are valuable and will be retained.
McShea’s argument is more ambitious than the line of
reasoning that we see in Schlichting’s use of reaction norms.
Schlichting’s core point is that differentiation itself, in a
genetically homogeneous collective, is not something that
must take evolutionary “work” or a special kind of expla-
nation. It is the nature of genetic systems to be sensitive to
environmental stimuli, and collections existing in space will
inevitablybesubjecttomicroenvironmentaldifferences.Thus,
we should regularly expect collectives of this kind to show the
beginnings of a developmental sequence. Differentiation per
se is not the same as adaptive, coordinated, differentiation, of
course. That requires mutation and natural selection acting on
the reaction norms themselves.
It is interesting that McShea and Schlichting have both,
in different contexts, been pushing against the same set of
informal assumptions about the explanation of complexity
and differentiation.18 My primary example here, however, is
Schlichting’s line of thought. What sort of thinking have we
applied,inworkingthroughhisargument?Wehavebeenmov-
ing back and forth between collective and contextual modes
of thinking, as a consequence of the different kinds of re-
lations that are relevant at different points in the story. To
apply the reaction norm concept we look at nontransitive and
nonsymmetric relations that link a biological entity to its en-
vironment, its surroundings, its context. It does not matter
whether this environment is biotic or abiotic. That is part of
the logic of the reaction norm concept. The explanation it gen-
erates here works because the cells we are describing are not
connected only by relations that are transitive and symmet-
rical, relations that merely group the cells into a collective.
If they were, the mechanism Schlichting describes would not
apply. To explain differentiation in a collection of cells using
the reaction norm concept, we apply a contextual mode of
thinking. But our aim, of course, is to explain the evolution
of a higher level collective—something with boundaries, divi-
sion of labor, and the ability to suppress internal conﬂict. The
aim is to explain what Michod (1999) calls a “transition in
individuality.”
The main themes of this paper can be summarized as fol-
lows. Owing to the rich theoretical development of multilevel
selection theory as applied to group-structured populations, it
has often been tempting to apply these concepts to other kinds
of population structure as well. The temptation is especially
strong when cooperative and altruistic behaviors are the focus
of explanation. But the key to the explanation of strong forms
ofaltruism—positivelycorrelatedinteractionbetweentypes—
can operate in neighbor-structured cases where higher level
collectives are absent. Though cooperation itself does not re-
quire the presence of higher level collectives, higher level col-
lectives of various kinds are often what we see. Evolution has
conspicuously included the evolution of various higher level
bounded collectives, including both loose social aggregations
andtightlyintegratedproductsof“transitionsinindividuality.”
Why has the evolutionary process tended to “package” coop-
erating entities in this particular way? In understanding these
transitions, gestalt switching between contextual and collec-
tive ways of thinking about population structure is exactly the
kind of thinking that will often be useful.
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Notes
1. The most natural deﬁnition of altruism for neighbor-structured populations
isahybridofthe“focal-complement”deﬁnitionandthe“individual-centered”
deﬁnitions of altruism discussed in Kerr et al. (2004). Suppose that  i is the
ﬁtness of an A-type individual with i neighbors of the A-type, and  i is the
ﬁtness of a B-type individual with i neighbors of the A-type. Then A is an
altruist if these three conditions hold:
(1)  i <  i, for i   {1,2,...,n};
(2)  i <  i+1, for i   {1,2,...,n   1};
(3)  i <  i+1, for i   {1,2,...,n   1}.
2. I include Okasha here because of his treatment of contextual analysis
(Damuth and Heisler 1988). For Okasha, contextual analysis is overall su-
perior to the Price equation and other methods for detecting group selection
in group-structured populations. This method can also be applied to neighbor-
structured populations. As I understand Okasha (2007), his conclusion is that
contextual analysis detects a kind of group selection in these cases too.
3. Foraninformalversionofthisargument,whichwasthegermofthisarticle,
see also Maynard Smith (2002).
4. The term comes from set theory and related parts of mathematics.
5. RelationR isreﬂexiveifandonlyifforallentitiesx intherelevantdomain,
x has R to itself. Symmetry: if x has R to y, then y has R to x. Transitivity:
if x has R toy andy has R to z, then x has R to z.
6. Absolute ﬁtness, not relative. Otherwise, it is trivial that everyone affects
everyone else’s ﬁtness.
7. Perhaps the reﬂexivity is not as obvious as the other features. The idea is
that any individual’s character affects its own ﬁtness; it would have a different
ﬁtness if it switched from altruist to selﬁsh, or vice versa, whatever its group
context.
8. In Godfrey-Smith (forthcoming), I discuss a case where the problem arises
from the symmetry requirement. It would also be possible (though more
378 Biological Theory 1(4) 2006Peter Godfrey-Smith
implausible) to generate a case where the reﬂexivity requirement creates the
problem.
9. This is how D. S. Wilson sometimes describes these cases (1980: 38–39).
10. More precisely, this is a condition on “MLS1.” See Damuth and Heisler
(1988) and Okasha (2007).
11. Wade (1985), for example, gives an inﬂuential theoretical summary of
the relations between hard selection, soft selection, kin selection, and group
selection using a Pricean framework that assumes a partition into equivalence
classes. There is no discussion of other kinds of population structure.
12. AversionofthisprincipleisatworkinNunney’svaluable(1985)treatment
of this issue.
13. Hamilton’s (1975) paper is usually interpreted as an endorsement of mul-
tilevel selection theory. In some ways it is, but Hamilton also explicitly notes
that the crucial role of correlation can operate in fostering altruism in a “vis-
cous” population where groups are absent; see p. 337.
14. Thissenseof“contextual”isdifferentfromthesenseseeninthe“contexual
analysis” of Damuth and Heisler (1988), though there are interesting relations
between the two.
15. Here I follow up a brief comment at the end of Kerr and Godfrey-Smith
(2002). See also Sterelny (forthcoming).
16. For an empirically oriented review of recent work on this topic, see King
(2004).
17. For a very short summary, in Spencer’s own words, of his biological
views, see chapter 15 of Belew and Mitchell (1996). I give a longer summary
in chapter 3 of Godfrey-Smith (1996).
18. The fact that they are thinking along similar lines is seen in this quote
from the McShea paper: “We are used to thinking of complexity as hard to
produce. The [Spencerian] internal-variance principle shows it to be easy. .. .”
(p. 155). Contrast Queller (1997: 186), who is thinking about the problem
very differently.
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